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Christopher J. Ruhm, University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro 
This article investigates whether prenotification decreases postdis-
placement joblessness. Reduced-form estimates indicate that lengthy 
written notice is associated with small increases in the probability of 
avoiding nonemployment but with no decline in average durations. 
Significant reductions are found, however, for household heads, 
women, nonwhites, and in local labor markets with high unemploy-
ment rates. A new method is developed to control for the endogeneity 
of voluntarily provided advance notice. This procedure suggests that 
previous research substantially overstates the degree to which preno-
tification reduces nonemployment and indicates that the actual de-
crease is between 2 and 5 working days. 
I . Introduction  
During the last decade, the United States has witnessed a lively policy 
debate concerning the efficacy of legislation mandating employer advance 
notification of plant shutdowns and mass layoffs. More than 125 bills 
relating to plant closings were presented in 30 states between 1975 and 
1983, and over 40 laws have been proposed at the federal level since 1979. 
Culminating this effort, the Worker Assistance and Retraining Notification 
Act (Public Law 100-379), which requires employers to provide 60 days' 
advance notice of plant closures and of large-scale layoffs, was passed into 
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law in 1988. Although the legislation contains numerous exemptions, with 
its passage the United States has joined virtually all other industrialized 
countries in regulating enterprise shutdowns and mass terminations.1  
This activity has taken place in the absence of reliable information on 
either the benefits or costs of mandatory notice. The situation has recently 
improved, however, with the release of several studies using nationally 
representative data from special Displaced Workers Supplements (DWS) 
to the January 1984 and January 1986 Current Population Surveys (CPS) 
(see, e.g., Addison and Portugal 1987a; Podgursky and Swaim 1987; Ehr-
enberg and Jakubson 1988; Kletzer 1989).2 This work suggests that prior 
notification decreases expected joblessness by around 1 month, mostly by 
raising the probability of avoiding nonemployment altogether. There is 
little evidence of reduced joblessness for persons who are unable to obtain 
immediate reemployment.3 
Unfortunately, the usefulness of this research is lessened because of lim-
itations inherent in the data sources and methodological approaches. Two 
data shortcomings are particularly troublesome. First, because the 1984 
and 1986 DWS provide no information on either the duration or type of 
notice, investigators are unable to distinguish among written notification, 
verbal announcements, and expectations of job loss in the absence of any 
type of notice. They also cannot differentiate the effects of short versus 
lengthy notice. Second, data on joblessness are limited to total weeks out 
of work between the date of displacement and the surveys, whether this 
transpires in a single spell or in multiple occurrences punctuated by short 
periods of employment. This is problematic for econometric duration 
models that typically require continuous spell information. Furthermore, 
for policy purposes, we are often interested in the initial period of job-
lessness. 
Previous studies have also paid relatively little attention to the potential 
endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice and have focused on 
average impacts rather than on the potentially large variations across 
worker, job, and geographic characteristics. Even if the average impact of 
early warning is fairly small, large benefits might accrue to population  
1.  Companies are required to provide advance notice and to negotiate with their 
employees and governments over layoffs in Canada and most Western European 
countries. By contrast, before 1988, only three states (Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii) 
had legislated any form of mandatory advance notice, with three others (Massa -
chusetts, Maryland, and Michigan) having voluntary programs encouraging com-
panics to provide warning or to continue employee benefits.  
2.  Also see Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984) for an earlier investigation 
using enterprise-level data for the state of Maine. 
3. Because the DWS does not distinguish between unemployment and nonpar -
ticipation in the labor force, the terms "joblessness" or "nonemployment" (rather 
than "unemployment") will be used throughout.  
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subgroups experiencing reemployment difficulties or for those whose job-
lessness raises particular concern.4 
The failure of earlier work to distinguish between informal and written 
notification is problematic for several reasons. First, the two types of notice 
need not change workers' estimates of the probabilities of impending job 
terminations in the same way. If they do not, their impact on predisplace-
ment search behavior and subsequent joblessness will differ. Second, since 
workers unusually well informed about labor market conditions are rel -
atively likely to both anticipate displacements and become rapidly reem-
ployed, estimates of the effects of informal notice are likely to overstate 
the benefits of formal notification. Third, some respondents may foresee 
their displacements prior to receiving written notice. If they act on these 
expectations by searching for new work, then the subsample acquiring 
formal notice will be disproportionately composed of persons who have 
looked for but failed to obtain new positions. These individuals will also 
typically have relatively long expected durations of postdisplacement job-
lessness. 
This study improves on each of the above shortcomings. A newly avail-
able data set ( the 1988 DWS) is utilized that contains information on the 
type and timing of notice and on the duration of the initial spell of job-
lessness.5 Reduced-form estimates are obtained for a model that includes 
full interactions between advance notice and the nonnotification covariates, 
as well as for a more conventional equation where early warning influences 
only the regression intercept. Finally, a new method is developed and 
implemented to provide endogeneity-corrected estimates of the effects of 
endogenously provided advance notification. 
Four primary findings are highlighted. First, earlier research substantially 
overstates the extent to which prenotification reduces postdisplacement 
joblessness. This occurs both because of the inability to distinguish between 
formal and informal notice, using previously available data sets, and because 
of the failure to correct for the endogeneity of advance notice.  
Second, although reduced-form regressions continue to show that both 
informal notice and lengthy formal notification are associated with in-
creased probabilities of avoiding joblessness altogether, only the former 
are also correlated with shorter average nonemployment durations.  
Third, substantial differences are observed across population subgroups. 
Of particular interest, formal notice received more than 2 months before 
the displacement is associated with significantly reduced joblessness for  
4. Podgursky and Swaim (1987) and Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) have allowed 
for some demographic group variations but have not included a full set of inter-
actions. 
5. Addison and Portugal (1989) have contemporaneously used the 1988 DWS to 
study some of the questions focused on in this article.  
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household heads, females, nonwhites, and displaced workers residing in 
local labor markets with high rates of unemployment.  
Fourth, the endogeneity of voluntarily provided notice is important. 
Formal warnings are disproportionately obtained by individuals possessing 
unobserved characteristics correlated with low reemployment probabilities, 
informal notification by workers with higher hazard rates out of nonem-
ployment. After implementing a new procedure to account for this unob -
served heterogeneity, prenotification is calculated to reduce postdisplace -
ment joblessness by an average of between 2 days and 1 week. This estimate 
is only one-fourth to one-eighth as large as that typically obtained in pre-
vious research. 
II. Data 
This article uses data from the Displaced Worker Supplement to the 
January 1988 Current Population Survey. The 1988 DWS contains retro-
spective information on previous job histories and on labor market status 
for a nationally representative sample of workers suffering permanent job 
loss between 1983 and January 1988. Included in the supplement are persons 
leaving their jobs prior to displacement (either to begin new positions or 
search for work), as well as those remaining with their predisplacement 
employers until the termination date.6  
The sample analyzed includes workers between the ages of 25 and 60 
who, at the survey date, lost jobs as the result of a business failure, plant 
closure or relocation, or a layoff resulting from slack work or from a 
position or shift being abolished. Persons terminating positions in agri -
culture, construction, or the armed forces are excluded, as are previously 
self-employed individuals and those displaced in the month of the survey.  
The 1988 DWS includes three questions pertaining to advance notice. 
The first inquires whether the worker did "expect a layoff or had received 
advance notice of a layoff or plant or business closing." This inquiry, 
which contains no information on either the type or timing of notice, was  
6. Information from the DWS is obtained for regular CPS respondents who answer 
affirmatively the question, "In the last 5 years, that is, since January 1983, has (he/ 
she) lost or left a job because of a plant closing, an employer going out of business, 
a layoff from which (he/she) was not recalled, or other similar reasons?" (emphasis 
added). Two types of evidence indicate that early job leavers answer this question 
in such a way as to be included in the supplement. First, more than an eighth of 
the sample analyzed below is out of work for less than 1 week before starting a 
new job. Such abbreviated joblessness is likely to be common only for persons 
finding new employment prior to displacement. Second, the 1984 and 1986 DWS 
supplements, which use identical inclusion criteria to the 1988 supplement, obtain 
a substantial proportion of affirmative replies to a question asking whether the 
worker did "leave that job before (he/she) would have been laid off." For example, 
Fallick (1991), who focuses specifically on this issue using the 1986 DWS, finds 
that 9.3% of displaced workers involved in plant closings (and 16.8% of this group 
who also receive advance notice) are premature job leavers. 
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also incorporated in the 1984 and 1986 DWS supplements and provided 
the only information on early notification available to previous researchers. 
The two questions added to the 1988 DWS ask if the respondent had "been 
given written advance notice that the business would be closed or that he/ 
she would be laid off" and, if so, "how long before he/she was to be laid 
off did he/she receive that notice?" Responses to the last question were 
categorized into the following ranges: less than 1, 1-2, and greater than 2 
months. 
The regression analysis includes covariates for a wide variety of indi-
vidual, job, and geographic characteristics. These are described in the Ap-
pendix. In addition to data obtained from the DWS and attached CPS, 
regressors were constructed using information from other sources. Variables 
indicating the state, industry, and occupation unionization rate and a 
dummy variable for residing in right-to-work states were included to proxy 
for collective bargaining status on the predisplacement job. The occupation 
unemployment rate, state or standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) 
unemployment rate, and the average industry employment growth rate 
were added to account for differences in economic conditions across lo-
calities and employment sectors.7 Variables measuring the predisplacement 
wage residual and predicted probability of receiving unemployment in -
surance benefits ( conditional on positive unemployment) were also in-
cluded.8 
III. Frequency of Advance Notice  
A slight majority (53.0%) of displaced workers anticipated their job 
loss, but only 15.1% received written advance notice of it, and just 5.0% 
were provided with formal announcements at least 2 months before the 
termination (see table 1, row 1).9 The percentage of workers with any  
7. The DWS identifies geographic location at the survey date rather than at the 
time of displacement. Since approximately 19% of the sample changed location 
between the latter and former period, this could lead to biased estimates of local 
labor market effects. To the extent that respondents are more likely to move out 
of depressed areas and into locations with low unemployment, this leads to an 
understatement of the impact of regional conditions. Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) 
and Howland and Peterson (1988) compare estimates with and without movers 
included in the sample and conclude that these biases are quite small.  
8. Some previous researchers (e.g., Addison and Portugal 1987a) have controlled for 
the actual receipt of unemployment insurance (UI) rather than the conditional 
probability. The receipt of UI is endogenous, however, since workers avoiding 
nonemployment are generally ineligible for benefits. Persons receiving benefits will 
therefore almost certainly have longer average joblessness, even in the absence of 
a true UI effect. 
9. These percentages were calculated directly from the DWS sample. Virtually 
identical percentages were obtained after adjusting for population weights. The  
weighted proportions are that 52.3% expected displacement, 15.1% received written 
notice, and 5.1% obtained written notification exceeding 2 months.  
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type of notice is similar to the 55% and 56%, respectively, calculated by 
Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) from the 1984 and 1986 DWS. The pro-
portion with written advance notice is also close to that in a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) survey of representative establishments; analysis 
of the GAO data revealed that 81% of workers received less than 1 month's 
warning and only 5% obtained over 90 days' notice in 1983-84 (U.S. General 
Accounting Office 1987).10 The GAO defines notice to include specific 
information (whether verbal or written) concerning the date of displace-
ment and workers affected. The similarity of the GAO numbers to those 
for written notification in the DWS suggests that precise verbal information 
is rarely provided.11 This implies that most workers who report that they 
"expected" their jobs to terminate, in the absence of written notice, probably 
also lacked specific unwritten information on when and whether the layoff 
would occur. 
Notified workers tended to be older, had greater job seniority, and more 
often worked in slow-growing industries or occupations than their non- 
notified counterparts. They more frequently lost jobs that provided group 
health insurance and were located in industries, occupations, and states 
with relatively high unionization rates. Nonnotified individuals were rel-
atively often nonwhite and displaced because of partial layoffs rather than 
plant closings (see table 1, cols. 2 and 3). 
The distinction between formal and informal notice is sometimes im-
portant. Nonwhites received written notification more often than whites 
but less frequently obtained informal warnings. The relative probabilities 
of acquiring lengthy formal notice were much greater for respondents with 
high job seniority, group health insurance coverage, and full-time work 
and for those affected by plant closings. Thus, 89.6% of displaced persons 
receiving more than 2 months' written notice left positions providing group 
health insurance, 72.6% were involved in plant closings, and the average 
job tenure of this group exceeded 9 years. The corresponding percentages 
for nonnotified respondents were 59.0% and 44.8%, respectively, and their 
mean seniority was just 4.5 years. 
Appendix table Al shows the results of maximum-likelihood probit and 
ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables represent various 
types of advance notice.12 These regressions show that, in addition to the 
10. See Brown (1987) for further discussion of the GAO study. A recent Conference 
Board survey (Berenbeim 1986) suggests that advance notice is provided more 
frequently. These findings are questionable, however, because of the nonrepresen-
tativeness of the sample and frequency of nonresponse. 
11. If specific unwritten notices were provided with any frequency, then the GAO 
percentages would be much higher than those for written notification in the DWS.  
12. The dependent variable in the ordered probit model equals zero, one, two, 
and three for persons receiving no, less than 1, 1-2, and over 2 months' written 
notice, respectively. 
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above-mentioned groups, written notice is particularly probable for 
educated persons, respondents in multiple earner families, recipients of 
positive wage residuals, and those residing in tight local labor markets or 
states with legislation mandating advance notice. 
There is evidence that prenotification is provided nonrandomly. To some 
degree this is not surprising. Unionized and long-seniority workers are 
expected to have high probabilities of being notified. That advance notice 
propensities also increase with education, wage residuals, number of earners 
in the household, health insurance coverage probabilities, and economic 
health of the local labor market suggests that prenotification is a normal 
good that workers demand more of as their compensation increases.  
IV. Advance Notice and Joblessness:  
Descriptive Information 
Most workers experience significant nonemployment following per-
manent job losses. For example, Ruhm (1991a) calculates that the average 
displacement leads to approximately a 12-week increase in unemployment, 
Dyer a 2-year period. Adding in the extra time out of work occurring 
during periods of labor force nonparticipation and that which would have 
been expected even in the absence of the termination (e.g., due to temporary 
Layoffs), total postdisplacement joblessness is significantly greater. Re-
spondents in the 1988 DWS averaged 27.4 weeks out of work in the initial 
spell of nonemployment; 35.4% were jobless more than 6 months, and 
12.8% for over 1 year (table 2, col. 1).13 
Notified workers avoided joblessness more frequently than their coun-
terparts and had a greater chance of being reemployed at the survey date.14 
Of this group, 13.9% experienced less than 1 week of postdisplacement 
joblessness, compared to 9.6 percent of their nonnotified peers (table 2, 
row 2). In January 1988, 74.7% of the former group were reemployed, 
versus 71.5% of the latter (see table 2, row 9). Workers receiving over a 
month of written advance notice were even more likely to find immediate 
reemployment. 
There is scant evidence, however, that prior notification substantially 
reduces the incidence of extended joblessness. An identical 33.5% of non- 
notified and notified respondents were out of work for at least 6 months; 
among the various categories of written notice, the corresponding prob-
abilities ranged from 33.9% to 37.8% (see table 2, rows 6 and 7). 
13. These calculations underestimate the extent of joblessness since reports are 
top-coded at 99 weeks and are censored for persons continuously out of work 
between the employment termination and survey date. Similar findings for the 
1984 and 1986 DWS are presented in Flaim and Sehgal (1985); Horvath (1987); 
and Podgursky and Swaim (1987). 
14. Respondents are defined to "avoid joblessness" if they become reemployed 
within 1 week of the displacement. 
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and (8) 
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The negative probit and positive AFT coefficients on WRIT1 and WRIT2 
indicate that short periods of formal advance warning, if anything, are 
associated with longer nonemployment durations. It is particularly striking 
that persons receiving written announcements less than 1 month before 
the layoff date were predicted to be jobless 38% longer than their 
nonnotified counterparts. This result barely misses being statistically 
significant.22 
in joblessness associated with advance notice because they do not adequately account 
for predisplacement search. Section VII of this article suggests that they also fail 
to take important endogeneity biases into account.  
22. The relationship between advance notice and longer-term employment stability 
was also examined by estimating a probit model of the probability of working for 
pay in January 1988. Coefficients on UNWRIT, WRIT1, and WRIT3 were positive  
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Since written notification generally provides more detail about the date 
and nature of impending displacements than informal notice, it is implau-
sible that the latter speeds reemployment while the former retards it. A 
more probable explanation is that the reduced-form regression model is 
misspecified because it fails to account for the potential endogeneity of 
advance notice. This possibility is addressed in Section VII.  
C. Advance Notice Interactions 
Coefficients on the interactions between advance notice and other co- 
variates, obtained from the regression model specified by equations (11b) 
and (8) or (10), are shown in table 5. Three types of prenotification are 
considered: UNWRIT and WRIT3 are defined as before, while WRITTEN 
is a new dummy variable that indicates formal notice of any duration (i.e., 
WRITTEN equals one if WRIT1, WRIT2, or WRIT3 is equal to one).  
Important variations are observed in the effects of advance notification. 
Particularly noteworthy are the large reductions in joblessness associated 
with lengthy periods of formal notice for household heads, women, non-
whites, and displaced workers living in areas with high unemployment. 
Substantial benefits were also obtained by persons departing jobs in oc-
cupations with low unemployment and possibly in rapidly growing in-
dustries (see table 5, cols. 5 and 6). 
Comparing the results in columns (1) and (2) to corresponding coef-
ficients in columns (5) and (6) in table 5 provides further evidence that 
the measured impact of informal notice differs markedly from that of 
written prenotification of the type now mandated by law. For instance, 
unwritten warning is of relatively limited value to heads of households, 
women, and minorities, whereas exactly the opposite is true for lengthy 
written notice. The large beneficial effect of formal announcements for 
workers in depressed local labor markets is not replicated when considering 
informal notice, but large decreases in joblessness for notified part-time 
workers are observed in the latter case. Signs on the interaction coefficients 
are also reversed for marital status, health insurance, plant closings, state 
union densities, and residence in right-to-work states. These findings further 
qualify the usefulness of previous research using broad definitions of ad-
vance notice that include expectations of job loss in the absence of written 
announcements. 
D. Summary 
Informal notice is correlated with substantial reductions in postdis-
placement joblessness. This finding is consistent with earlier research uti - 
while that on WRIT2 was negative. The predicted effect was fairly small in all 
cases, however, and the t-statistic never exceeded 0.71. This suggests that prior 
notification either has no effect or slightly improves future employment prospects. 
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lizing broad definitions of prenotification. The results are new and dra-
matically different, however, when attention is restricted to the written 
notice now mandated by law. Formal announcements received at least 2 
months before permanent layoffs were associated with smaller increases 
in the likelihood of avoiding joblessness and with no reductions in the 
average durations. More substantial benefits were observed for heads of 
households, women, nonwhites, and persons residing in depressed local 
labor markets. Shorter periods of written notice neither reduced durations 
nor increased probabilities of moving directly into new jobs. The point 
estimates actually imply longer joblessness, which may indicate the failure 
to account for endogeneity in the provision of advance notice. The results 
also suggest serious shortcomings in previous analyses that have relied on 
broad definitions of prenotification. 
VII. Endogenous Advance Notice 
Prior to 1989, only three states (Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii) required 
employers to provide advance notification of impending terminations. Re-
duced-form models estimated using the DWS therefore indicate the rela-
tionship between voluntarily provided advance notice and postdisplacement 
joblessness. If firms warn employees on a nonrandom basis, these estimates 
may poorly indicate the impact of mandated prenotification.  
Endogeneity bias could cause the prenotification effect to be either under- 
or overstated. If firms more frequently notify workers in depressed local 
labor markets rather than in healthy ones (in order to minimize premature 
quits), then early warning is likely to be associated with small reductions 
or even increases in joblessness. This occurs because new employment is 
especially difficult to obtain when local unemployment rates are elevated. 
Conversely, if individuals with a special aversion to unemployment both 
work for employers providing notice and are less selective in the positions 
they will accept, then, following terminations, advance notice will be neg-
atively correlated with postdisplacement joblessness, even if there is no 
"true" notification effect.23  
Two additional factors are likely to cause the benefits of informal notice 
to be overestimated. First, workers who are particularly well informed 
about labor market conditions will both anticipate job losses and rapidly 
find new employment more often than their counterparts who are less 
knowledgeable. Second, ex post rationalization may lead persons with 
satisfactory reemployment experiences to respond that they anticipated 
23. Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) provide the most extensive analysis to date 
of the endogeneity problem but are unable to resolve it with any satisfaction. They 
conclude, "We are skeptical of our ability to use the estimates obtained here to 
control for the endogeneity of advance notice in the duration of nonemployment 
and postdisplacement wage equations" (p. 45). 
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displacements, while those with greater difficulties report being surprised 
by involuntary terminations. 
Conversely, an artifact of the DWS questionnaire procedures may result 
in the gains from formal notice being understated. The problem occurs 
because the survey fails to ascertain whether job terminations are anticipated 
prior to the receipt of written announcements. To the extent that they are, 
formal notice is likely to be disproportionately obtained by workers with 
low reemployment probabilities, as persons with better employment al-
ternatives are more likely to leave the firm prior to the time at which the 
written notice is provided. A more detailed discussion of this sorting bias 
is included in the Appendix. 
A. Testing for Endogeneity 
The search model suggests that prenotification should either speed 
reemployment or have no effect on expected durations. The former result 
occurs if early notice increases the time or intensity of predisplacement 
search, the latter if advance warning has no effect on search behavior. 
There is no theoretical reason why advance notice should ever delay reem-
ployment. Evidence that early announcements are associated with increased 
joblessness therefore provides a clear indication that they are dispropor-
tionately provided to workers with low hazard rates. In this case, reduced- 
form estimates understate the benefits of prenotification. 
Section VI B showed that formally notified individuals have relatively 
lengthy nonemployment spells, suggesting the importance of the just - 
mentioned endogeneity bias. Confirming evidence is obtained by examining 
the cumulative reemployment probabilities of notified and nonnotified 
workers. The probability that an individual with observable characteristics 
X and notification status N becomes reemployed within a maximum of t 
periods is F(tX, N). The search model implies that F(tX, N = 1) will 
be at least as great as F(tX, N = 0), for any given t, unless notified 
workers possess unobserved characteristics associated with delayed reem-
ployment. 
Cumulative reemployment probabilities (hereafter simply denoted as 
"reemployment probabilities") through durations of 18 weeks are displayed 
in table 6. The first panel shows actual percentages of workers with spells 
ending within the specified time period. The second panel displays pre-
dicted probabilities for a hypothetical worker with personal, job, and geo-
graphic characteristics equal to the sample averages. These estimates are 
obtained from probit models that include the full vector of covariates, with 
the dependent variable equaling one (zero) if nonemployment is less than 
or equal to (greater than) the specified number of weeks.  
At durations of 2 weeks or more, predicted reemployment probabilities 
are uniformly lower for workers receiving written notice than for their 
counterparts surprised by displacements. For instance, the hypothetical 
worker has a 0.433 probability of ending joblessness within 8 weeks if no  
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notice is provided (see table 6, col. 1). This compares to probabilities of 
0.392, 0.363, and 0.361, respectively, if less than 1, 1 -2, or over 2 months' 
written notice is obtained ( cols. 3 -5). Similarly, the predicted probability 
of reemployment within 18 weeks is 0.579 without prenotification versus 
0.504, 0.516, and 0.471 if the respective durations of formal notice are 
received.24 
Despite the extra time available for search, formally notified workers 
have longer nonemployment durations than their observably similar coun-
terparts who do not expect displacements. Written announcements are 
therefore disproportionately received by persons who, controlling for ob-
servable characteristics, have low hazard rates. This could result from the 
previously mentioned sorting process and certainly indicates serious biases 
in the reduced-form regressions. It is also noteworthy that predicted reem-
ployment probabilities of formally notified workers are always lower than 
corresponding sample rates. This shows that written announcements are  
24. The differences in predicted reemployment rates become even more pronounced 
beyond 18 weeks. 
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nounced for lengthy spells. For instance, the probability that the hypo-
thetical worker's spell ends within 53 weeks is 89.4% when notice is re-
ceived. If the termination were unexpected, however, then the 
corresponding 54-week reemployment probability is only 87.4%. This 
seemingly small difference is more dramatic when survival rates are con-
sidered. Informally notified workers have a 10.6% probability of remaining 
jobless beyond 53 weeks, nonnotified counterparts continue to be out of 
work past 54 weeks 12.6% of the time. Thus, corresponding survival prob-
abilities are almost 19% larger for the latter group than for the former. 
The more rapid reemployment associated with informal notice is therefore 
at least partially attributable to this type of early warning being system-
atically obtained by workers with high hazard rates.  
B. Endogeneity-corrected Estimates 
This section develops a procedure for calculating endogeneity-corrected 
estimates of the effect of advance notice. The key assumption made is that 
prenotification reduces durations by raising the probability of avoiding 
nonemployment but has no effect on hazard rates once the spell of job-
lessness begins. This assumption is not entirely realistic. For instance, if 
individuals engage in systematic search, then both reservation and offer 
wages will decline with the period of advance notice. The reduction in 
reservation wages increases hazard rates, while the fall in expected wage 
offers lowers them. It is therefore not obvious whether prenotification will  
raise or lower hazard probabilities at given durations of joblessness. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the fall in expected wage offers dominates,  
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Table 8 displays predicted 1- and 5-week reemployment hazards, eval-
uated with a nonnotification covariates set equal to the sample means. 
Hazard probabilities generally decline with spell durations, as is expected 
if the regressors fail to account for all relevant heterogeneity. For instance, 
1-week hazard rates average 0.0669 between 1 and 4 weeks, 0.0477 between 
5 and 8 weeks, and 0.0365 between 9 and 12 weeks. Displaced workers 
also appear to "round off " reported durations of joblessness. Thus, there 
is a jump in the hazard rate at 1, 2, 6, 12, and 18 months, as well as at 10, 
15, and 20 weeks. The rise in reemployment hazards in the neighborhood 
of 26 weeks also suggests the effect of exhausting unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
Nonnotified workers with sample-average characteristics are predicted 
to avoid nonemployment 6.9% of the time. This rises to 10.9% if written 
announcements are provided more than 2 months before the displacement 
and 12.0% if informal notice is received (see table 6). Substituting these 
values for F(01 X, N) and the hazard rates in table 8 into equation (12) 
and solving yields predicted nonemployment durations. They are 29.11 
weeks for individuals surprised by displacements, 28.11 weeks for the in-
formally notified, and 28.70 weeks for workers receiving more than 2  
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months' written notice.28 This implies that prenotification reduces average 
postdisplacement joblessness by between 0.41 and 1.00 weeks. 
It is instructive to compare these findings to the reduced-form estimates 
of this and previous research. The model in Section VI B yielded the pre-
diction that informal notice decreases durations by approximately 1 month. 
This result accords closely with earlier studies examining broad measures 
of prenotification using the 1984 and 1986 DWS. In contrast, formal no-
tification was associated with longer nonemployment durations. As argued 
above, these findings fail to correct for important endogeneity biases that 
occur because informal (formal) notice is predominantly received by per-
sons with high (low) hazard rates. The endogeneity-corrected estimates 
presented in this section indicate that prenotification reduces nonemploy-
ment durations by between 2 days and 1 week. This is only one-eighth to 
one-fourth as large as the estimate typically obtained by previous re-
searchers. 
VIII.  Summary and Conclus ions  
The effect of advance notification on postdisplacement joblessness is 
analyzed using a new data source that differentiates between written notice 
and less formal types of early warning. This distinction has been largely 
ignored in previous research even though informal notification, which 
includes both verbal announcements and ill-defined "expectations" of im-
pending displacements, is of limited relevance for the current policy debate 
on the efficacy of legislation mandating specific written notice.  
Reduced-form estimates of the effects of formal and informal notice 
differ dramatically. Workers expecting terminations, in the absence of 
written notice, have higher probabilities of avoiding nonemployment and 
shorter spell durations than their nonnotified counterparts. Lengthy formal 
notice is associated with smaller increases in the likelihood of escaping 
joblessness altogether and with no decline in the average duration of non- 
employment. Written announcements received shortly before the date of 
displacement neither reduce average durations nor increase the probability 
of avoiding joblessness. 
Reduced-form estimates of the prenotification effect also vary signifi-
cantly across population subgroups. For instance, durations are relatively 
short for formally notified household heads, females, nonwhites, and res -
idents of local areas with high unemployment. The same differential effects 
are not observed when focusing on informal notice, however, which further  
28. The need to calculate an infinite sum is avoided by noting that, with constant 
hazard rates, h, the expected remaining spell duration is 1/h. Thus, spells continuing 
past 92 weeks are expected to last for an additional 16.15 (1/0.0619) 5-week periods, 
or 80.78 weeks. Since respondents specify weeks of joblessness in integer values, 
there is some ambiguity as to exact spell durations. For this analysis, one-half week 
was added to all responses. The estimated impact of prenotification is insensitive 
to this assumption. 
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suggests that previous research examining broadly defined advance noti-
fication poorly indicates the impact of the formal warnings now mandated 
by federal legislation. 
Reduced-form models also fail to account for the possibility that preno-
tification is systematically provided to workers with high or low exit rates 
out of nonemployment. Analysis of cumulative reemployment probabilities 
indicates that informally (formally) notified individuals possess unobserved 
characteristics associated with high (low) reemployment hazards. This 
implies that reduced-form estimates understate (overstate) the beneficial 
effects of written (unwritten) advance notice. 
A technique was developed to correct for this endogeneity of advance 
notice. The procedure assumes that prenotification raises the probability 
of avoiding nonemployment altogether but has no effect on hazard rates 
once the spell of joblessness begins. Using this approach, advance notice 
is estimated to reduce nonemployment durations by between 2 days and 
1 week. This is between one-eighth and one-fourth as large as the typical 
estimate of previous research. 
Future work should attempt to explicitly model the process by which 
workers become informed about future displacements. Until this is done, 
it will be unclear to what extent advance notice provides employees with 
new information. Greater attention also needs to be paid to variability in 
the effects of prior notification across population subgroups. As shown 
above, these differences are frequently larger than the average impact. The 
endogeneity problem likewise deserves more sophisticated analysis. Al-
though prenotification is now mandated by the federal government, the 
legislation includes numerous, often vaguely specified, exemptions. This 
ensures that employers will continue to have considerable discretion in 
deciding whether or not to provide advance notice.  
Finally, consideration of the effect of advance warning for subsequent 
earnings is needed. Recent research suggests that increased postdisplace-
ment joblessness is largely transitory, while the associated wage changes 
are more permanent (see Topel 1990; Ruhm 1991a). Thus, the main po-
tential benefit of prenotification may be to reduce the earnings losses. One 
recent study (Ruhm 1991b) indicates that relative wage gains exceeding 
10% are obtained by persons receiving lengthy written notice. These earn-
ings effects, if verified by subsequent research, are substantially larger than 
the small reductions in joblessness focused on in this analysis.  
Appendix 
Written Advance Notice and Sorting Behavior  
To demonstrate potential sorting bias in reports of written advance 
notice, consider a situation where (1) hazard rates are constant over 
time; (2) the population consists of two groups with hazard functions 
h1(t) = h, and h2( t) = h2, respectively, where h, > h2 and the shares of 
 
28 Ruhm 
 
 
Advance Notice and Postdisplacement Joblessness 29 
 
 
30 Ruhm 
 
 
Advance Notice and Postdisplacement Joblessness 31 
 
References 
Addison, John, and Portugal, Pedro. "The Effect of Advance Notification 
of Plant Closings on Unemployment." Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 41 (October 1987): 3-16. (a) 
 __ . "On the Distributional Shape of Unemployment Duration." Re- 
view of Economics and Statistics 69 (August 1987): 520-26. (b) 
 ______ . "Advance Notice and Unemployment: New Evidence from the  
1988 Displaced Worker Survey." Unpublished manuscript. Columbia:  
University of South Carolina, August 1989. 
Berenbeim, Ronald E. Company Programs to Ease Plant Shutdowns. New 
York: Conference Board, 1986. 
Brown, Sharon. "How Often Do Workers Receive Advance Notice of 
Layoffs?" Monthly Labor Review 110 (June 1987): 13-17. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald, and Jakubson, George. Advance Notice Provisions in 
Plant Closing Legislation. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 1988. 
Fallick, Bruce C. "Advance Notice and Destructive Attrition." Unpublished 
manuscript. Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, March 
1991. 
Flaim, Paul 0., and Sehgal, Ellen. "Displaced Workers of 1979-83: How 
Well Have They Fared?" Monthly Labor Review 108 (June 1985): 3-16. 
 
32 Ruhm 
Folbre, Nancy; Leighton, Julia; and Roderick, Melissa. "Plant Closings 
and Their Regulation in Maine, 1971-1981." Industrial and Labor Re-
lations Review 37 (January 1984): 185-96. 
Horvath, Francis W. "The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers 
of 1981-5." Monthly Labor Review 110 (June 1987): 3-12. 
Howland, Marie, and Peterson, George. "Labor Market Conditions and 
the Reemployment of Displaced Workers." Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 42 (October 1988): 109-22. 
Kletzer, Lori G. "Industry Wage Differentials and Permanent Job Loss: 
Do Workers Displaced from High-Wage Industries Have Longer Du-
rations of Joblessness?" Unpublished manuscript. Williamstown, Mass.: 
Williams College, May 1989. 
Kokkelenberg, Edward, and Sockell, Donna. "Union Membership in the 
United States." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 38 (July 1985): 
497-543. 
Lancaster, Tony. "Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemploy-
ment." Econometrica 47 (July 1979): 939-56. 
Podgursky, Michael, and Swaim, Paul. "Duration of Joblessness following 
Job Displacement." Industrial Relations 26 (Fall 1987): 213-26. 
Portugal, Pedro, and Addison, John. "Advance Notification and the Job 
Search Process: Notification Interval, Unemployment Time Saved, and 
Absence of Intervening Spell of Joblessness." Unpublished manuscript. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina, March 1989. 
Ruhm, Christopher J. "Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Dis - 
placements?" American Economic Review 81 (March 1991): 319-24. (a)  
 _____ . "Advance Notice, Job Search, and Postdisplacement Earnings."  
Unpublished manuscript. Greensboro: University of North Carolina,  
June 1991. (b) 
Swaim, Paul, and Podgursky, Michael. "Advance Notice and Job Search: 
The Value of an Early Start." Journal of Human Resources 25 (Spring 
1990 ): 147-78. 
Topel, Robert. "Specific Capital and Unemployment: Measuring the Costs 
and Consequences of Job Loss." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy 33 (1990): 181-214. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1988. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.  
U.S. Department of Labor. Employment and Earnings. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Limited Advance Notice and Assistance 
Provided Dislocated Workers. GAO/HRD-87-105. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. 
 
